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COMMENT
Turkey, The EEC and Labor Law:
Is Harmonization Possible?
If the European common market is to function successfully, every
member state of the European Economic Community ("EC") must un-
dertake the harmonization of its laws with the laws of the Community.1
The area of labor law, in particular, is one in which EC norms are ulti-
mately to govern. While labor law has indeed been a traditional concern
of the original member states,2 it, along with workers' rights, has taken
on heightened importance as the unification of the European market ap-
proaches.3 As an essential step toward attaining its goal of becoming a
unified market, the EC is standardizing social policy throughout the
member states-and in the EC, social policy essentially means workers'
rights.
4
Consistent with this commitment, in late 1989 the Council of Minis-
ters5 effectively adopted two documents, thereby spelling out "a compre-
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, Article 100, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 15. [hereinafter "Treaty"]. [European Economic Community, hereinafter "EC"].
2 This concern is evident from both the Treaty and directives enacted by the Council of Minis-
ters establishing principles of cooperation among member states in the area of labor law, working
conditions and employment (Treaty, supra note 1, art. 118), equal pay for men and women (Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 119), equal treatment for men and women (Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February
1976 The Implementation of Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employ-
ment, Vocational Training and Promotion, and Working Conditions 1976 0.J. (L 39) 40. [hereinaf-
ter "Council Directive 76/207"], a recommendation for a forty-hour work week and four weeks paid
vacation annually (Council Recommendation 75/457 of 30 July 1975 O.J. (L 199), [hereinafter
"Recommendation 75/457"] and health and safety in the work place (Council Directive 89/391 of
12 June 1989 (L 183)).
3 See generally Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities:
What "'Social Europe" Means to United States Based Employers," 11 NW. J. oF INT'L L. & Bus. 564
(Winter 1991).
4 Id. at 568.
5 Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 145-154 (delineating powers of Council) (The Council of Minis-
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hensive EC platform on European worker rights policy."6 The two
documents were the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights
of Workers and an implementing document entitled the Social Action
Program.7 The Charter, representing the Commission's first wide-rang-
ing declaration in the labor and social rights area, lists twelve basic social
rights of EC citizens. Together, these documents outline the implemen-
tation of extensive worker rights.
In 1987, after more than twenty years of economic association with
the EC,' Turkey applied for full membership in the Community. When
Turkey is admitted into the EC,9 its entry will be conditioned on the
harmonization of its laws with those of the EC. 10 The object of this pa-
per is to examine the feasibility of Turkey accomplishing this task.
The paper begins by examining several preliminary questions. The
first is, does EC law exist, and if so, what is it? The history of the EC will
be considered briefly, and its legal structures examined. The second,
more interesting query is this: Is the Charter itself EC law? In answering
this, the controversy surrounding the "passage" of the Charter and the
Social Action Program will be detailed and the legal status of the Charter
among Europeans considered.
Next, the paper will compare and contrast Turkey's current labor
law with that of the EC. This analysis will be performed with reference
to past EC labor legislation, and in light of the labor norms expressed by
the Council in the Charter. The differences in Turkish and EC laws will
be analyzed in terms of whether and how Turkey's laws are deficient, or
less beneficial to workers than the EC law. Finally, there will be a gen-
eral conclusion as to whether Turkey is deficient with respect to EC labor
norms, and if it is deficient, Turkey's prospects for remedying those defi-
ciencies will be discussed. This discussion will include a short exposition
ters was established by the Treaty of Rome, and is granted the "ultimate authority in implementing
EC law"). Dowling, supra note 3, at 576.
6 Dowling, supra note 3, at 583.
7 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 471 final [hereinafter "Char-
ter"i; Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Program Relating to the Imple-
mentation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM (89) 568 final
[hereinafter "Social Action Program"].
8 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 238 (Association Agreement between EC and Turkey).
9 This is far from a foregone conclusion. The current application is doomed to fail solely polit-
ical and economic grounds. Additionally, questions about human rights abuses by the Turkish gov-
ernment remain. lain Cameron, Turkey and Article 25 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 37 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 887 (Oct. 1988).
10 In fact, Turkey has already agreed to take measures to comply with certain provisions of the
Treaty, including those pertaining to approximation of laws. Association Agreement, supra note 8,
at art. 16.
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of other factors, political and economic, which may influence the ease or
difficulty of the harmonization task.
I. DEFINING EC LAW
The EC began as a trade group." Initially a limited international
affiliation, in 1951 six countries, including West Germany, Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, signed an agreement
known as the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity.12 Six years later these countries expanded their relationship, con-
cluding the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community.13
In practice, the Treaty acts as the constitutional document underlying all
EC law.' 4 It regulates the common market relationships between the six
original signatory countries, plus six countries which later ratified the
document: Denmark, Ireland, Britain, Greece, Spain and Portugal.
Like the U.S. constitution, which establishes the U.S. federal gov-
ernment and delineates the roles of its branches, the EC Treaty creates
and authorizes the EC's decision-making bodies.15 The Treaty estab-
lishes the EC Council of Ministers, granting to it the ultimate authority
to implement EC law. 16 European Community law may take several
forms, known together as instruments: directives, which require each
member state to integrate a point of EC policy into its national law; 7
regulations, which bind member states directly, even without legislation
on the part of the member state;'" decisions, which address fact specific
situations;' 9 and recommendations, or opinions, which are non-binding
statements of EC policy.20
Under the Treaty arrangement, the Council implements these in-
struments only by acting upon proposals which originate with the EC
11 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 574.
12 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140, 145.
13 Treaty, supra note 1.
14 Dowling, supra note 3, at 575.
15 Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 137-198.
16 Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 145-154 (delineating powers of Council). The EC Council is
comprised of the heads of state of each of the twelve member countries. See Dowling, supra note 3,
at n. 49.
17 Treaty, supra note 1 at art. 189 ("Directives shall bind any member state to which they are
addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form
and means.").
18 Id. at art. 189 ("Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in every
respect and directly applicable in each Member State.").
19 Id. ("Decisions shall be binding in every respect for the addresses named therein.").
20 Id. ("Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.").
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Commission.2 1 It is the Commission which initiates the EC law-making
process when it submits a proposal of law in the form of an instrument of
one of the above-mentioned types. The proposal will receive proposed
amendments from the Parliament2 2 , after which the Commission may
adopt the proposal, with or without the amendments.23 Finally, the pro-
posal reaches the Council. If the Council ratifies the proposal, it becomes
EC legislative law.24
Following ratification, the EC member-state legislatures are re-
quired to act in one of a number of specified manners. The action to be
taken is dependent on the particular instrument enacted. Because it is
purely a statement of Council policy, a directive is binding as to its result
only. The decision of how best to accomplish the goal of the policy ex-
pressed in the directive is left to each member-state legislature, with the
intent of permitting each to implement the policy as it sees fit.25 A regu-
lation, on the other hand, must be directly implemented by the member-
state legislature.26 In contrast to a regulation, a recommendation is less
restrictive in nature. Since it does not represent a binding enactment, its
passage by the Council leaves the member state two options. The state
may either adopt the instrument in whatever form it deems appropriate,
or it may elect not to adopt the instrument in any form. The instrument
known as a decision is distinct from these other three. As the decision
carries no binding force upon those other than the parties to whom it is
addressed, it has far less general application to the member states.
Having examined the nature of EC law, and its relationship to the
laws of the member states, we may examine harmonization itself, and
then discuss the Charter in that context.
II. HARMONIZATION AND THE CHARTER
A. Harmonization
The vision of an integrated European market dates back to the
Treaty.27 The major barrier to this common market is the existence of
21 Id. at arts. 155-63 (powers of the Commission). The Treaty specifically empowers the Com-
mission with responsibility over a number of "social" concerns, including employment and labor law
and working conditions. See Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 54.
22 Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 137-44 (powers of Parliament). Parliament's Treaty-authorized
role is essentially limited to "consultation". See Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 55.
23 Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 137-198.
24 Id.
25 See supra note 17.
26 See supra note 18.
27 Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 61 (original 1957 Treaty had set out timetable, which ultimately
was never met, for completion of a single market).
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laws regarding business and trade which differ greatly between member
states.28 Harmonizing the laws of the member states is intended to break
down this barrier to a successfully functioning market.29 The Treaty's
mechanism for achieving harmonization is Article 100.30 Article 100
commands that the Council "shall.. .issue directives for the approxima-
tion of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
actions in Member States which directly affect the establishment or func-
tioning of the common market.
'31
1. To What Extent Hannonization?
As the word "approximation" implies, one important issue of har-
monization is determining the degree of harmonization necessary. One
may look to Article 100 for guidance. Its language appears to mandate
that harmonization accomplish that degree of uniformity which would
enable the common market to function uninhibited. Buttressing this in-
terpretation is language in the article implicitly contemplating that legis-
lation promulgated under the Treaty will necessitate the revision of
national laws by member states.32 Therefore, it may be said that Article
100 contemplates a high degree of harmonization of substantive law. It
is important to note, however, that the Treaty also recognizes the neces-
sity of allowing a certain amount of latitude to the member state legisla-
tures in enacting standard laws.33
While the substantive latitude allowed to the state legislatures in en-
acting laws is not so wide as to render the directive meaningless, nor is it
so narrow as to be inconsequential. The Treaty allows latitude by mak-
ing the directive the instrument of choice in EC legislation.34 European
Community directives can be viewed as ends to be accomplished through
28 3 Common Mkt. Rep. 3300. ("The activities of business enterprises are influenced consider-
ably by the legislation of the countries in which they are established. To engage in business in a
country, enterprises must comply with numerous requirements imposed on them" and on their prod-
ucts, by law for various reasons of public policy, and also in areas of private law, and labor and tax
legislation. Operating and production costs are both affected by the set of laws which govern the
enterprise. The variation of these laws, regulations and administrative actions from one country to
another "gives rise to non-tariff trade barriers affecting aspects of trade such as the free movement of
goods, services, persons or capital, and the conditions of competition.") Infra at 3302.01.
29 Id. at 3300.
30 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100.
31 See supra note 28, at 3300.
32 Id.
33 Supra note 28, at 3300.
34 Id. ("The process of'approximation' ... must allow the national legislatures a certain amount
of latitude, and, for this reason, the directives are called for as the means for achieving the ends
desired") Id.
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means chosen by the member-state legislature.35 Directives give member
state legislatures discretion in implementation, allowing for variations in
the states' individual legal systems and economic situations. 36 More im-
portant than exact replication of the directive is consistency between the
policy underlying the directive and underlying the member state provi-
sion, and the resulting enhancement of the operation of the single
market.
37
However, it should be stressed that the existence of some latitude
does not imply that the degree of harmonization required is low. By
definition, a directive is binding as to its result. 38 Furthermore, the EC's
goal, eliminating trade barriers, is more nearly accomplished when the
degree of harmonization is high. Therefore, while latitude is necessary in
allowing for different legal and economic climates, this latitude must be
considered a necessary evil, for it creates tension with the goal of elimi-
nating barriers to the common market. Accordingly, substantial harmo-
nization is the EC's goal, as anything less would act as a hindrance to the
smooth operation of the single market.
3. The Evolution of Harmonization Since the Treaty
Having explored the issue of the extent, we examine the evolution of
harmonization in the EC since the signing of the Treaty. Although first
envisioned in the Treaty,39 the EC put off its goal of a single market for
many years.' The idea was revitalized with the issuance of the White
Paper, declaring December 31, 1992 as the deadline for the completing
unification.41 At that time, the Commission recognized the fact that har-
monization was a necessary element of unifying the market.42
There are at least two major reasons for labor laws to be included
within the category of laws which require harmonization. One reason is
35 See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of a directive on the
legislature of a member state.
36 See supra note 28, at 1 3302.11. Relevant to understanding why some latitude is granted to
the member-state legislatures is the fact that approximation is not meant to be equivalent to unifica-
tion. Infra at q 3302.09.
37 Id. at 1 3302.02.
38 Id.
39 Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 61 (original 1957 Treaty had set out timetable, which ultimately
was never met, for completion of a single market).
40 Id. at n. 63 (the first wave of "Europhoria" died in the early 1960's, but re-emerged in the
1980's).
41 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil, COM(85)310 final [hereinafter "White Paper"]. Although the Treaty had originally proposed a
single EC market, only in March 1985 did the Council set the 1992 goal for completion.
42 Id. at 1J 24-218. The White Paper set out a plan for eliminating three categories of "barriers"
which divide the twelve member states: physical, technical and fiscal.
450
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the deleterious effect on employment of non-uniform labor laws.43 As
companies restructure in order to adapt to a growing, more competitive
international market, these companies will attempt to bring down all
costs, including labor. This restructuring consequently gives rise to con-
cerns about a decrease in the standard of living and an increase in unem-
ployment. A second reason that labor law must be harmonized is to
prevent or minimize "social dumping."'  Social dumping is the invest-
ment, by companies, in places where the wages and conditions are the
cheapest, forcing workers in countries with a higher standard of living to
lower their standard of living in order to compete.45 Harmonizing labor
laws, will place all the member states on the same level of competition for
businesses, at least with respect to labor costs.
The relationship between labor law and the common market has
been acknowledged by the EC in several ways. First, Article 118 of the
Treaty states that "in conformity with its general objectives," the Com-
mission shall "promote close cooperation between member states in the
social field".' Matters relating to the social field include employment
and labor law and working conditions.4 7 Secondly, the member states
agree that there is a need for improved working and living conditions for
workers.4 Finally, the Treaty provides that men and women shall re-
ceive equal pay for equal work.4 9
However, although harmonization in the social field is envisioned by
these provisions, the Treaty prescribes no specific measures for its reali-
zation. In reality, the Treaty is ambivalent toward harmonization in the
social field. The second paragraph of Article 117, concerning living and
working conditions, reveals this ambivalence.5" The language of that ar-
ticle denotes a passive attitude toward harmonization, emphasizing that
harmonization will simply "result" from the functioning of the common
market, which will "favour" the harmonization of social systems, while
only in passing, mentioning the procedures set forth in the Treaty and
43 Roger Blanpain, 1992 and Beyond: The Impact of the European Community on the Labour
Law Systems of the Member Countries, 11 Comp. LAB. L. J. 403, 404 (1990).
44Id.
45 Id. at n. 3 and accompanying text. European Community unionists use this slogan to convey
their fear that free European trade will cause industry to abandon higher-wage Northern Europe,
and exploit Mediterranean workers by denying them needed work place protections and benefits.
See also Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 93 and accompanying text.
46 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 118.
47 Id.
48 Id. at art. 117.
49 Id. at art. 119.
50 Id. at art. 117.
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the provisions on approximation of laws.51 There is some tension, there-
fore, between the Council and the Commission's failure to address social
issues in the treaty, and the issuance of a broadly sweeping document
such as the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.
The EC's initial reluctance to address social issues straight on, re-
flected in Article 117, and its overall lack of initiative with respect to
labor regulation before 1985, may stem from the fact that the EC
originated as a trade group.5 2 In 1985, however, the seeds of active regu-
lation of the social field were planted.
It was at that time that the Commission issued its White Paper to
the Council, in which, it finally set forth a concrete agenda for the EC's
single market.53 The well-known deadline by which the new market
would be completed, December 31, 1992 was set. Outlining a plan for
the elimination of physical, technical and fiscal barriers which divided
the member states, the document became the organizational structure
behind the entire single market program.54 Conspicuously absent was an
explicit acknowledgment of social barriers.55 Notably, however, the pa-
per briefly mentioned the need for social as well as economic union, stat-
ing that the goals of forming social cohesion and social policy were
inextricably linked to the Treaty and to the central objective of a single
European market.
56
Subsequent to the White Paper, the member states ratified the Single
European Act ("SEA").57 That document implements the EC single
market program. Ratification had the effect of giving the White Paper's
market unification program the force of EC law, and made the unifica-
tion mandatory.5 8 To ensure that this process could be completed by the
1992 deadline, the Act revised the legislative process of the Council. It
did so by abolishing the former requirement of unanimity among Council
representatives, substituting a requirement of only a "qualified majority"
vote among Council representatives for adopting instruments.59
Significantly, however, the qualified majority method is specifically
51 Id.
52 For an outline of the social policy of the Community during this period, see SOCIAL EUROPE
at 51-62 (Jan. 1987) and SOcIAL EUROPE at 19-20 (Jan. 1988).
53 White Paper, supra note 41. See generally Dowling, supra note 3, at nn. 64-87.
54 Dowling, supra note 3, at 578.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 519.
57 Single European Act, February 17, 1986, 29 O.J. Eur. Comm. No. L169, (effective July 1,
1987). See Dowling, supra note 3, at nn. 83-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Single
European Act. The Act was ratified in order to give the White Paper the force of Treaty law.
58 Dowling, supra note 3, at 579.
59 Dowling, supra note 3, at 580 (Single European Act, supra note 57, at arts. 14, 16-18). "Qual-
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disapplied to EC legislation "relating to the rights and interests of em-
ployed persons."'  The SEA purports "to retain the old unanimous ap-
proval mechanism" for legislation relating to these areas.61 The only
labor or social proposals which do not require unanimous approval are
those concerning health and safety.62 So while the text of both the White
Paper and the SEA give attention to social Europe,6 3 neither actively
campaigns for the progress of the concept. The effect was to relegate
labor and social issues to the role of step-child to the unification pro-
gram, leaving trade as the prodigal son, another reflection of the union's
history as a trade group.64
The proponents of a social Europe never saw its legislation as futile,
however, and an extensive political debate ensued from the SEA. At
least one author has argued that ceding priority to trade matter was a
carefully calculated plan for ultimately gaining Council approval of
sweeping social legislation.65 At the time the single market program was
initiated, both Britain (under former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher)
and Europe's business community opposed a cohesive social Europe, de-
siring instead a single market program limited to trade."
While the EC officially held that an efficient single market could not
exist without a social rights scheme, it appears to have recognized the
political reality that openly promoting "social Europe" would be deadly
to the program's momentum.67 Accordingly, the EC went about win-
ning commitment for the SEA by emphasizing its trade aspects, namely,
efficient trade and a consumer block 320 million citizens strong.68 The
results were just what the EC hoped for. The business community be-
came an avid supporter of the 1992 plan, and by 1989, the Commission
was sincerely able to claim irreversible commitment to the plan.69
ified majority" means a vote weighted upon the member states' population. Member states' votes
range from ten (W. Germany, France, Italy, U.K.) to two (Luxembourg). Infra at n. 85.
60 Id. at 580 (SEA, supra note 57, at arts. 14, 16 17, 18, amending Treaty, supra note 1, at arts.
8b, 28, 57(2), 99, 100(a).
61 Dowling, supra note 3, at 580.
62 Id. at 593; See also 3 Common Mkt. Rep., supra note 28, at art. 100a § 2.
63 Dowling, supra note 3, at 580.
64 Id. at n. 91 and accompanying text.
65 Id. at 581-584.
66 Id. at 581. The opposition of the business community to a social Europe, no doubt, has much
to do with already relatively high labor costs. Additionally, to the extent the new market will elimi-
nate traditional national policies of protectionism in certain sectors, less competitive EC businesses
are almost certain to fail. Id. at n. 97. Thatcher resisted not only a social Europe, but also resisted
the post-White Paper movement toward EC economic and political union. Id. at n. 103.
67 Id. at 581.
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B. The Charter
1. Its Passage
The test of this commitment came in 1989. Confident that the plan
was afait accompli, the Commission issued the Charter.70 The Charter,
which enumerated twelve fundamental worker rights, was subsequently
fleshed out by the Social Action Program ("SAP"). 7 1 Together these
documents spell out a comprehensive workers' rights policy, and specifi-
cally outline a plan for the implementation of expansive worker rights in
the EC.72 After two drafts, the Council effectively adopted the Charter,
over Britain's objection, in December of 1989.
71
Britain's objection to the Charter raises important questions relating
to its legal status, in light of the reformed voting requirements imposed
by SEA Article Eighteen.74 Article Eighteen explicitly applies the re-
quirement of unanimous approval for passage of labor legislation, except
where proposals relate to the health and safety of workers. 75 While the
Charter was under consideration by the Council, its status was watered
down from Directive to Solemn Declaration. This move anticipated
Britain's objection and was made in hopes of changing Britain's vote.76
But even this watering down did not sway Britain to approve the docu-
ment.77 Britain's objection frustrated unanimous passage of the Charter.
The Charter deals wholly with matters concerning employed persons,
and it was not technically passed.78 Consequently, the Charter is neither
a directive nor even a unanimously approved statement of EC policy.
79
70 Id. (Charter, supra note 7). For a general discussion of the contents of the Charter, see Dow-
ling, supra note 3, at 594-614.
71 Social Action Program, supra note 7. The Social Action Program ("SAP") documents more
thoroughly the rights contained in the Charter. Furthermore, it expounds in some detail upon 47
new instruments the Commission proposes to undertake in order to implement the Charter, Dow-
ling, supra note 3, at 59), and lists actions which are underway to that effect. Lastly, the SAP
allocates responsibility for choosing the form and method for accomplishing its goals between the
Commission and the member states.
72 Dowling, supra note 3, at 582. By U.S. standards, the Charter is relatively employer-restric-
tive. Infra at 583-84. See also Dowling at n. 108 (citing, as examples in support of this proposition,
the fact that employers oppose the Charter because of clauses which encourage unionization, give
workers access to company records, and give them a voice in management).
73 Id. at 583, 590-594.
74 Incorporated as amended Treaty of Rome art. 100a, Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100a §§ 2-3,
incorporating SEA, supra note 57, §§ 2-3.
75 SEA, supra note 57, at art. 18, §§ 2,3.
76 Dowling, supra note 3, at 590. The Charter is not one of the instruments of official EC law.
Id. at 592. For discussion of the instruments of EC law, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying
text.
77 Dowling, supra note 3, at 590.
78 Id. at 592-593.
79 Id. at 592. To employers, the Charter has no legal meaning as a Solemn Declaration. Id.
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Accordingly, a question exists as to its legal status, and what, if any,
binding legal force it maintains. 80
2. The Charter's Legal Status
Two views of the Charter's legal status exist. The EC employers'
lobby argues that the Charter is a legal nullity.81 Their view stems from
the requirement that the adoption of measures relating to rights of em-
ployed people may only occur upon a unanimous vote of approval.
Under this requirement, imposed by the SEA, 2 the employers view Brit-
ain's vote against the Charter as a veto, rendering it invalid as EC
legislation. 3
The EC social lobby naturally views the Charter's status differ-
ently.8 4 The social lobby believes that the Charter was legally adopted
with votes to spare. Like the employers' lobby, the social lobby's view
centers on the voting procedures set forth by the SEA. However, the
social lobby relies, as its authority, on a different section of that
document.
As the employer's lobby points out, the SEA imposes a unanimity
requirement for passage of labor and social legislation.8 5 However, Sec-
tion Three of the same article carves out an exception, for labor legisla-
tion relating to the health or safety of workers, from the unanimity
requirement. 86 With respect to health and safety measures, only a mere
qualified majority of the Council is necessary to gain passage.87 Given
that the very concept of a social Europe is, in the eyes of the social lobby,
essential and integral to worker health and safety,88 it follows that all or
most of the twelve points in the Charter fit within the Section Three
health and safety exception to the unanimous approval requirement.89 In
this perspective, the Charter needs only a qualified majority for approval,
more than furnished by the eleven to one vote.
This section has become the focus of hot debate. While employers
80 See id. at 591-593.
81 Id. at 592-593.
82 Id. at 592. On the underlying authority of the treaty for EC social regulation, see Treaty,
supra note 1, at Part Three, Title III, arts. 117-128. For citations to general discussions of the
Treaty's authorization of such legislation, see id. at n. 172.
83 Dowling, supra note 3, at 592.
84 Id. at 593-594.
85 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
86 Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 178 (Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 100, § 3).
87 Dowling, supra note 3, at 593.
88 Id. Evidently, the social lobby reasons afortiori that anything concerned with workers' gen-
eral welfare promotes better worker health. Id. at n. 179.
89 Id. at 593-594.
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perceive that each of the Charter's guarantees involve the rights and in-
terests of employed persons generally, the social lobby takes a more ab-
stract view of the documents, emphasizing the underlying policies of
social welfare. However, while this legal debate still rages, its impor-
tance has been significantly diminished by events which have taken place
since the vote on the Charter. 90
These events were initiated immediately after the eleven to one pas-
sage of the Charter, when the Commission began work on draft direc-
tives implementing the Social Action Program.91 In mid-1990, the
Commission issued its first proposed directives, concerning part-time and
overtime labor.92 By treating the Charter and Action Program as an ac-
tive agenda for a social Europe, the Commission has effectively validated
the documents.93 In actuality, the focus of the debate over the Charter's
legal status has shifted away from the legal status of the Charter to the
Commission-proposed instruments under the Social Action Program.94
The employers' lobby has increasingly addressed the 47 SAP-proposed
instruments in recognition of the effective, if not technical, legal status of
the Charter from which the directives are drawn.95 The documents have
taken on a political significance all their own.96
In all, these events have "steamrolled the threshold argument that
the Charter has no legal status."' 9 7 European Community social regula-
tion is overwhelmingly approved by Europeans generally. The social
lobby has argued persuasively that the Charter falls within the health and
safety qualified majority approval exception to SEA article eighteen. The
Commission is at work on numerous social proposals based on the Char-
ter and the Social Action Program, and much of the European business
community has jumped irreversibly on the single market bandwagon.
The Charter, as well as the Treaty and instruments issued prior to it, is
' 90 See id. at nn. 182-188 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of why this debate
has diminished in importance.
91 Id. at 595.
92 Id. Proposal for a Council Directive on Certain Employment Relationships with Regard to
Distortions of Competition, COM(90)228 final SYN 280, 1990 O.J. (C 224) (Aug. 30, 1990). [herein-
after "Proposed Directive on Working Conditions"]; Proposal for a Council Directive Supplement-
ing the Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of Temporary
Workers, COM(90)228 SYN 281 (Aug. 13, 1990). Additionally, in 9/90, the Commission issued a
draft of a directive which would require a minimum 14 weeks employer-provided maternity leave.
See Maternity Leave in the EC, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1990, at A7, col. 4.
93 Dowling, supra note 3, at 595.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 596.
96 Id. at 595. One study has found a 70% acceptance rate of the EC-level social regulation
among Europeans generally. Id. at n. 184.
97 Id. at 595.
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EC law, constituting laws with which member countries must harmonize
their laws.
II. THE CHARTER AND THE DIRECTIvEs
The Charter is a bill of twelve guarantees to all EC workers. These
include free movement, fair pay, and improved working conditions. Fur-
thermore, provisions concerning social security, collective bargaining,
and vocational training are also included. Equal treatment of men and
women, worker consultation and participation in management, and
health and safety in the work place, along with protection of children and
adolescents, and of the aged and the handicapped are the remaining
guarantees.98
In addition to the rights guaranteed under the Charter, some other
worker protections have been established by either the Treaty or by
Council instruments. The Treaty itself prohibits discrimination in pay
based on sex. 9 A directive provides procedural protections against col-
lective redundancies (mass lay-offs),1°° and a recommendation which
suggested the adoption of a uniform forty hour work week along with a
minimum of four weeks paid vacation per year for each employee has
also been approved. 10 1 The guarantees of the Charter, the Treaty and
several instruments will be examined at length in the next section, which
treats the comparative aspects of EC labor law and Turkish labor law.
III. COMPARISON OF TURKISH AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
Having recently submitted an application for full membership in the
EC, Turkey must concern itself with harmonization issues.102 Turkey
needs to initiate measures for harmonizing many areas, but this article
will concentrate on labor law issues. In analyzing current Turkish labor
law, it is helpful to briefly review the contemporary history of labor legis-
lation in Turkey. 103 The period after World War II was a formative one.
Turkey permitted the formation of free trade unions, although their ac-
98 Id. at 590 (Charter, supra note 7).
99 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 119.
100 Council Directive 75/129 of 17 February 1990 Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 1990 O.J. (L 48).
101 See supra note 2.
102 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
103 For a detailed historical analysis of this subject, see generally Shabon, A. & Zeytinoglu, I., The
Political, Economic and Labor Climate in Turkey, (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School,
Industrial Research Unit, 1985); or Dereli, T., Turkey, International Handbook of Industrial Rela-
tions, Contemporary Developments and Research, (Albert Blum, ed., Greenwood Press, Westport,
Conn., 1981).
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tivities were restricted." Furthermore, Turkey achieved significant or-
ganizational development by establishing a Ministry of Labor, a Social
Insurance Organization, and an Employment Service Organization." 5
Additionally, social security and worker's insurance systems were
developed. 106
As a consequence of democratic changes after 1960, many labor re-
forms took place." 7 First, because of worker support, organized labor
assumed a highly respected place in society.08 Additionally, while the
1961 Constitution stressed economic and social development, it also em-
phasized basic rights of minimum wages and social security. 10 9 The
rights to organize, to bargain collectively and to strike were guaranteed
by the 1961 Constitution.' 10
However, major changes have occurred in Turkey since the refor-
mation period. Turkey's current atmosphere has become increasingly
hostile to labor, much like the period prior to 1960. Recent legislation
constricts worker rights that had been granted as a result of the 1961
Constitution. After the military take-over of 1980, the 1961 Constitution
was abolished; I II a new one took its place in 1982.112 The 1982 Constitu-
tion brought major changes to the Turkish industrial relations system.
More specifically, it restricts the individual and collective rights of the
workers."13
The current curtailment of worker rights in Turkey contrasts
sharply with the expansion of worker rights occurring in the EC. We
have seen that the EC has adopted broad social policy, worker rights and
worker protections." 4 Indeed, European employment related policy
consists of legislated rights guaranteeing substantial worker benefits, and
104 Shabon, supra note 103, at 133.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. This period of hospitable treatment of labor came as a reaction to the suppression of labor
during the reign of the Democratic Party, and to developing industry and increasing numbers in
wage-earning labor groups. Id. at 133-134.
108 Id. at 133.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 136 (TURK. CONST. OF 1961, arts. 46 & 47).
111 Id. at 134.
112 Id. at 134-135. TURK. CONST. (The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1982) [hereinafter
"Constitution"] This version of the Constitution is still in place. Id. See Turkish Public Workers Get
160% Raise, RauTERs LIBRARY REPORT, July 23, 1991. Furthermore, as of July, 1991, the current
labor laws were those which were passed subsequent to the military coup of 1980. See Shabon, supra
note 103, at 134-136.
113 Shabon, supra note 103, at 135.
114 See generally Dowling, supra note 3.
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assurances of job tenure. 115 This comment closely examines the current
labor law situation in Turkey and exposes glaring deficiencies in Turkish
law, when compared with EC law.
A. Wage Determinations
One major change in working conditions brought by the new Con-
stitution is a decrease in wages. The 1961 Constitution required a mini-
mum wage to be determined with reference to the goal of improving the
individual worker's living conditions, rather than a business's ability to
pay.116 In contrast, the new constitution provides a new procedure for
setting the minimum wage.117 Minimum wages are now set not only ac-
cording to the general economic climate, 1 ' but also according to the eco-
nomic condition of the specific industries, and area-wide differences in
social and economic situations. 119 When contrasted with the 1961 Con-
stitution, the pro-employer nature of the 1982 Constitution is clearly
revealed.
The wage provision is a prime example of the divergence of Turkey's
law from EC law. The Charter assures that employment "shall be fairly
remunerated" with an "equitable wage sufficient to enable [workers] to
have a decent standard of living."'"0 The EC determination of wages
intended to assure maintenance of a certain standard of living for the EC
worker is more in line with the provision of the abolished 1961 Constitu-
tion than with Turkey's new constitution. So while European workers
are guaranteed fair pay in the Charter,12' minimum Turkish wages are
set without reference to a minimum standard of living.' 22
In addition to losing a standard of living-based minimum wage,
Turkish workers may also lose their constitutional right to paid annual
leave and paid weekend rest, formerly required under the 1961 Constitu-
tion. 123 While this does not mean that all workers have lost their paid
annual leave or other benefits,' 24 the worker is forced to rely solely on
115 Id. at n. 14 and accompanying text.
116 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 135.
117 Id. at 135.
118 Id. Turkey's general economic climate has been in steady decline for several years. The Con-
sumer Price Index, with 1983-100, was 899.3 in 1988. Turkey, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, released
by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, prepared by American Em-
bassy, Ankara, 1988 [hereinafter FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS].
119 Shabon, supra note 103, at 135.
120 Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 202 and accompanying text (Charter, supra note 7 at 5).
121 Id.
122 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 135.
123 Id.
124 Turkish workers earn wages and fringe benefits which vary according to contract negotiations.
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contract negotiations in order to win benefits which had previously been
guaranteed to him or her. Because the employer is no longer obligated to
provide these benefits, prospective employees may choose to forego them
in order to undercut competition for jobs. This situation may continue
until it is no longer possible to locate a position with these particular
benefits.
This loss of benefits directly opposes EC law. The EC Council long
ago issued a recommendation for a forty hour work week with four
weeks annual paid vacation.125 The EC Council's message in this recom-
mendation is that in the interest of social progress, and of equalizing
competitive conditions, limiting and standardizing work-weeks and giv-
ing annual leave was an immediate objective for all member states.126
Another wage problem in Turkey is wage disparity among workers
in the private sector, the public sector (state-owned industry) and civil
servants. According to statistics, wage disparities between categories of
workers are significant and growing.12 7 For example, in 1988, the private
sector labor movement generally won collective agreements which kept
pace with inflation. 28 Furthermore, some private sector unions claim to
have kept up with inflation over the five year period of 1983-1987.129
The public sector, however, has not done as well in that period.
130
In fact, public sector real wages trailed private sector wages by a signifi-
cant margin.1 31 Furthermore, civil servants, or government workers,
earn significantly less than public sector workers.1 32 In light of this situa-
tion, Turkey's government has proposed a new constitutional provision
Textile workers' negotiators, for example, have won the following "not atypical" benefits which
translate to extra payments to workers: Allowances for children; for the wedding of a worker or his/
her dependent; for heating fuel; the death of a relative, four extra months salary yearly; bonuses
three times yearly; lump sum prior to annual vacation and 25 days of leave per year and others.
Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 7.
125 See Recommendation 75/457, supra note 2.
126 3 Common Mkt. Rep. % 3910.25.
127 See Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 3.
128 Id. However, using 1983 price and wage levels as 100, real wages in the private sector were
down to 85.2. Id.
129 Id. at 4. This claim seems to have been substantiated in light of the agreements won in 1988.
Id.
130 Id. at 4.
131 Id. On the scale of 100, public sector wages were only 74.4 in 1987. Id. at 3. One major
factor for this lag is that State Economic Enterprises ("SEEs") have traditionally provided workers
many benefits which workers in the private sector have traditionally enjoyed, thereby decreasing
actual wages. Id. at 4.
132 Shabon, supra note 103, at 135. This is due to the fact that they are denied the right to
bargain collectively. See Dereli, supra note 103, at 563. This problem is exacerbated due to the
government's policy of construing the term "civil servant" broadly. This policy has resulted in many
public sector employees, who meet the legal definition of "worker", being termed civil servants. Id.
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for accomplishing the elimination of wage disparities. 133 Incredibly, the
government proposes to solve inequalities by decreasing the wages of all
workers to the level of the lowest paid civil servants.
1 34
While it is the EC Commission's view that wage-setting is a matter
for the member states, labor and industry alone, 13 ' Turkey's policy is
nonetheless inconsistent with EC policy. Charter wage policy is twofold:
maintaining the EC worker's standard of living, and preventing social
dumping. 136 According to the Commission, the single market "would be
pointless if the standard of living and of social protection attained by the
average European were called into question." 137 It follows that, under
the Charter, the EC Council would not tolerate a wage determination
method, like Turkey's, which produced wages substantially below a pre-
ordained standard-of-living-based wage. Since both degradation of the
standard of living and social dumping would follow such deviation, such
a method would be against the policy underlying the Charter.
It follows from the above analysis that Turkey's constitutional wage
determination provisions are deficient with respect to EC wage laws. A
minimal standard of living is irrelevant to the new wage determination
process, and does not even mention improving that standard. Further-
more, the constitution proposes to lower the wages of both private and
public sector employees down to the level of the civil servant. If Turkey
joined the EC today, social dumping would become reality - businesses
in Europe would vie for Turkish locations to take advantage of the low
wages. Additionally, the Charter's express policy of improvement in
standard of living could not be accomplished. Therefore, the single mar-
ket would be defeated.
B. Trade Union Rights, Collective Bargaining and Right to Strike
The trend toward pro-employer policy and diminished worker
rights in Turkey is evident in more areas than one. It is also evident in
restrictions on collective rights in general. For instance, although the
1982 Constitution permits unionization, 138 it still restricts the activities
of the unions in comparison to the abolished constitution. 139 Workers
enjoy the freedom to join a union and the right to be free from coercion
133 Shabon, supra note 103, at 135.
134 Id.
135 Social Action Program, supra note 7, § 2.
136 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
137 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 588 (Social Dimension of the Internal Market - Commission
Working Paper, Foreword).
138 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 136 (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 51).
139 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 52).
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to join or not join." 40 However, a worker may be a member of no more
than one union or trade guild.141 Moreover, unions are absolutely pro-
hibited from cooperation or affiliation with, or participation in, any polit-
ical activity. 142 Additionally, the government maintains tight controls on
union finance, restricting the ways in which the union may spend its
money. 143 In the same vein, the constitution prohibits active young
political leaders from attaining influential union positions by prohibiting
workers with less than ten years experience as laborers from holding ex-
ecutive positions.144
Not only union rights, but collective bargaining and strike rights
were restricted by the 1982 Constitution. The 1961 Constitution gave
workers a right to bargain collectively and to strike without specified
limitations and with express permission to strike over disputes relating to
economic and social status. 145 The 1982 constitution, on the contrary,
explicitly limits collective bargaining to issues of wage determination and
working conditions. 1" The right of Turkish workers to strike over any
issue but these two is eliminated. 147
It is further apparent that if any workers retain a right to strike at
all, it is a merely technical right, and not an effective one.'14  First, all
strikes of solidarity, sympathy, political or general types are expressly
prohibited. 149 Second, lawful strikes15° are not permitted for many
workers,' and if permitted, may take place only after mandatory arbi-
tration fails.' 5 2 Third, not all disputes may legally justify a strike. The
140 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 51).
141 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 51).
142 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 52).
143 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 52).
144 Id. (Constitution, supra note 112, at art. 51).
145 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 137.
146 Id. at 137. (Constitution supra note 112, at art. 53). Furthermore, collective bargaining pro-
cedures are set forth by the government. Id. The government has much power over this process.
For instance, it may postpone for one month or prohibit the strike, where, in its own judgment, there
is a national emergency. Id. at 170.
147 Id. at 139. The 1961 Constitution allowed strikes over rights disputes, in addition to sympa-
thy, secondary, political or general strikes. Id.
148 See generally id. at 163-17 1, for a more detailed analysis of the Collective Bargaining, Strike
and Lockout Act of 1983, No. 2822.
149 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 139.
150 Lawful strikes are only those which have as their aim improving or safeguarding the economic
or social condition of the employee. Shabon, supra note 103, at 169.
151 Id. Workers in some "crucial" industries (public or private, presumably) do not have the
right to strike at all. Id. at 171. Furthermore, this ban on strikes has been extended to other indus-
tries, such as public sectors services (e.g. transportation, waste collection, health services and power
plants) and also to many other public sector workers, such as civil servants (who have neither the
right to bargain collectively or strike). Id.
152 Id. at 167 ("Disputes and Meditation"), 169 ("Strikes and Lockouts"). There must be sixty
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Collective Bargaining Act distinguishes between interest disputes and
rights disputes. 153 An interest dispute is one in which the parties are
unable to agree over a new contract issue.' 54 A rights dispute, on the
other hand, is one which stems from disagreement over the interpretation
of an existing contract. 5 Strikes are permitted only when an interest
dispute occurs, and are prohibited when a rights dispute occurs.156
Lastly, the procedures and regulations pertaining to striking appear to be
intentionally designed to frustrate and discourage workers from
striking.
1 57
The views of the Constitution expressed inside Turkey confirm that
it is unfavorable to the worker. The reaction to the 1982 Constitution
has been severe. Reportedly, even members of the Constitutional Com-
mission have expressed great dissatisfaction with the document. 58 Turk-
days of negotiation before a strike may be called. If one of the parties does not appear for negotia-
tions or if no agreement occurs after sixty days, the government intervenes by assigning a mediator.
Id. at 167. The Supreme Arbitration Board, an entity comprised of a built-in majority of govern-
ment and employer representatives, attempts to resolve impasses. This mechanism virtually prohibits
the only power of the union, strike. Id. at 169. Sharing this view is Turk-Is, Turkey's largest labor
union. Since 1985, Turk-Is has refused to send representatives to the Board, reasoning that labor
will never prevail over government and employer members which they feel will always win together.
Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 8.
153 Shabon, supra note 103, at 168.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. When mediation has failed to resolve a rights dispute, the disagreeing party must bring
the dispute before a labor court. Id.
157 See generally id. at 169-171 ("Strikes and Lockouts"). The government clearly expresses an
anti-employee pro-employer view. The law emphasizes that workers on strike must leave the work
place. The employer may engage in production with non-striking employees, although he may not
hire new employees. The law protects workers by preventing the termination of employment, but
prohibits employees from finding other employment for the duration of the strike while permitting
the employer to take goods, inventory and machinery outside the plant. Furthermore, picketing is
effectively prohibited; only two striking union members may picket at the plant; the public may not
be informed of the strike by way of placards or pamphlets; and strikers are even forbidden from
erecting shelter from bad weather outside the plant. Id. Moreover, whether or not a strike is lawful,
the workers will be responsible for damages to the work place stemming from the strike; yet there is
no corresponding duty on the employer to compensate the workers for losses stemming from an
employer's lockout. Id. at 139. A startling example of the government's hostile attitude toward
striking workers is a ban on "song and dance" by workers while picketing, in which the government
further threatened the use of "anti-gnerilla commandos" in case of "industrial violence". (Turkey
Bans Song and Dance on Picket Lines, REUTERs LIBRARY REPORT, October 5, 1989.)
158 See id. at 139 (Marvine Howe, Turkey's Charter Seems to be Winning, N.Y. TIMES, November
8, 1982, at A3; Marvine Howe, What Turks Said in Voting, N.Y. TIMES, November 9, 1982, at A5.)
There is a feeling among many politicians, legal professionals, associations, and TURK-IS officials
alike that the new constitution will serve only to perpetuate a dictatorial scheme in Turkey. Id. For
instance, the Minister of Labor was quoted as saying that "the constitution is not compatible with
Turkish traditions," and a member of Assembly stated that "the aim of building a strong state by the
constitution has been overdone." Id. (These critics have been labelled "traitors" by the government.
Id.) These sentiments are reflected in the headline of a newspaper article, Metin Munir, Turkey's
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Is, the largest labor union in Turkey, 159 has criticized the constitution,
saying that it will forever prevent a pluralistic democracy from being
established in Turkey, and that the "concept of the state being a protec-
tor of social rights (social state) will be lost...; individual liberties,
including the right to strike, will be endangered; and the trade unions
would be faced with the possibility" of being banned (emphasis ad-
ded).16  Turkey's bar association agreed wholeheartedly.161
Together, these statements confirm that although Turkish workers
technically maintain the freedom to associate, to bargain collectively and
to strike, these freedoms are not as real as those enumerated in the Char-
ter of Fundamental Social Rights. The lack of freedom for the Turkish
worker to bargain collectively and to strike are serious issues which Tur-
key must deal with. Currently, collective bargaining is limited in scope
to wage determination, and workers may strike only over economic is-
sues. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution is seen as threatening even
these limited freedoms.
This situation is irreconcilable with the rights which already exist in
the EC member states, and with the rights enumerated by the Charter.
For example, the freedom of association and the freedom of collective
bargaining are established fundamental rights in all the member states.16 2
Moreover, the right to strike is a right which the Commission has re-
ferred to as fundamental.163
But what is more, the Charter is meant to expand collective bargain-
ing rights beyond their present scope. It is evident from the language of
the Charter that the negotiation not just of standard economic issues, but
also of workers' social rights under collective agreements is to be inferred
from the Charter.' Because the primary methods for implementation
Constitution Prompts Fears of Return to Days of the Sultanate, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 27, 1982, at
2.
159 Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 8. Turk-Is dominates the labor scene in Turkey,
counting as its members roughly two-thirds of Turkey's unionized workers. Id. at 10.
160 Shabon, supra note 103, at 140.
161 Munir, supra note 158. The president of the Bar Association attacked the constitution, saying
that it "manifests distrust towards the judiciary while, on the other hand, investing excessive powers
in the executive and could enable governments to establish authoritarian rule." SHABON, supra note
103, at 140.
162 See Social Action Program, supra note 7, at § 6 ('The right to freedom of association and
collective bargaining exists in all the Member States of the Community"). Id.
163 Id.
164 See generally Bob Hepple, The Implementation of the Community Charter of Fundamental
Social Rights, 53 MOD. L. REv. 643, (Sept. 1990). "If the process of 'implementation' [of the Char-
ter] is effective, one may expect the 'fundamental social rights' themselves to have a dynamic charac-
ter, moving from their present anaemic state towards a full-blooded system of individual rights
within a framework of freedom of association, collective bargaining and industrial democracy." (em-
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of the Charter itself are to be both legislation and collective bargain-
ing, 65 and because there is no pre-determined preference for legislation
over collective bargaining,166 the possibility that many or all of the Char-
ter's rights are potential bargaining issues follows naturally. Confirming
this view, the Commission expressly seeks the inclusion of a social dia-
logue in the collective bargaining process. 6 7
It follows from the Commission statement that social issues sought
to be included in the collective bargaining process are those specified in
the Charter. Examining the Charter from this perspective, it becomes
apparent that the scope of collective agreements in Turkey is far nar-
rower than the scope of EC collective agreements will be in the near
future. This difference is more readily perceived by distinguishing among
two types of social rights found in the Charter. First, there are rights
more closely identified with economic issues. Examples of economic is-
sues which, under the Charter, may potentially be negotiated collectively
include working time standards (including total weekly hours and over-
time provisions), weekly rest periods and paid annual leave. 168 These
issues appear to be highly oriented to remuneration and related to social
concerns less directly. It is only these issues which may be addressed by
Turkish collective agreements. 169
However, as discussed above, 170 the Charter envisions collective
agreements as encompassing all the other enumerated rights as well. As
opposed to the above-mentioned economically-oriented rights, other
Charter rights are recognizable as socially-related issues, or at least issues
which are less directly related to the economics of employment. Such
issues include health and safety, worker participation and consultation,
phasis added) Id. at 643. Expansion of the scope of collective bargaining is actually envisioned by
the Charter itself. Part II of the Charter contemplates its implementation at both a national and
Community level. Id. Article 27 casts responsibility on the member states to guarantee the funda-
mental social rights in the Charter and to implement the measures as part of a strategy of economic
and social cohesion. Id. The methods of implementation are "notably through legislative measures
or collective agreements." (emphasis added) Brian Bercusson, The European Community's Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 53 MOD. L. REv. 624, 641, (Sept. 1990). It may be impor-
tant to note that the adjective, "notably", connotes that legislation and collective agreements are, as
legal measures, on the same level. Id.
165 See Bercusson, supra note 164, at 641.
166 Id.
167 Social Action Program, supra note 7, at § 6.
168 See supra note 98 and accompanying text for enumeration of the fundamental social rights
identified in the Charter.
169 See supra Part III, § 2 for discussion of the scope of Turkish collective agreements. See also
Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 7 for a discussion of a "typical" collective agreement.
170 See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text, relating to the inclusion of social issues in the
collective bargaining process in the EC.
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social protection, vocational training and improved working condi-
tions.171 None of these issues, however, are allowed to be negotiated
within a collective agreement in Turkey. 172 In Turkey, these issues fall
entirely within the scope of a collection of government regulations,
known as the Labour Law Act. 
1713
C. Working Conditions
The major instrument of Turkish labor legislation is the Labour
Law of 1983.17 The Labour Law controls the fundamental rules of la-
bor-management relations. 175 It encompasses most industrial workers,
defining the concepts of work place, worker, employer and employee and
employee representative. 176 In addition, it explains the participative
management and profit sharing programs put into place by the executive
branch. 17 7 The major provision of the Labour Law is the requirement of
individual service contracts with the employer.
178
1. Individual Service Contracts
According to the Labour Law, all contracts with a duration of
longer than one year must be written.179 A legal distinction is made be-
tween permanent employees and temporary employees (defined as em-
ployees who contract for 30 days or less). 8" The Labour Law, in large
part, does not apply to temporary employees.' The effect is that tempo-
rary employees do not receive the protections of the Labour Law with
respect to working conditions. Consequently, the temporary employee is
at a disadvantage, because she must resort to negotiating these conditions
into her own contract, presumably at a high cost.
171 See Charter, supra note 7.
172 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 137.
173 The Labour Law of 1971, Act No. 13943 (amended 1983, No. 1475).
174 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 141. The Labour Law deals strictly with the individual em-
ployment relationship, where the employee works under a service contract, an individual contract of
employment at a specified wage for an employer at a specific job. Id. For a comprehensive summary
of the Labour Law's provisions, see id. at 141-145.
175 Id. at 145.
176 Id. The law covers most of the industrial workers in Turkey. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. In practice, if there is no collective bargaining agreement to cover the worker, the parties
do not sign a written contract, and an oral contract or paycheck substitutes for the contract. Id. at
146.
180 Id. at 147.
181 Toker Dereli, Turkey, in 10 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LAB. & INDUS. REL. at 81-82
(Blanpain ed., Kluwer, Netherlands, 1982).
466
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This situation contravenes the dual policies of the Charter.s 2 Forc-
ing an employee to negotiate his or her own working conditions under
circumstances of high competition exacerbates social dumping and the
deterioration of the standard of living. Furthermore, in the case of short-
term employment, employers are encouraged to take advantage of their
presumably superior bargaining position. The EC Commission appears
to have recognized these facts themselves. Among the first post-Charter
directives proposed by the Commission in 1990 was a directive which
would require employers to treat part-time and seasonal employees the
same as full-time indefinitely-employed workers in matters of benefits,
collective bargaining and other matters. 183 Turkey's practice of different
treatment for temporary and permanent workers is clearly inconsistent
with the EC view.
2. Working Time Standards
Aside from differences in treatment of temporary versus permanent
employees, the Labour Law appears sufficiently employee protective,
with respect to working conditions, to meet the standard which would be
set by other directives proposed by the Commission. For instance, the
standard work week is limited by the Labour Law to forty-five hours,184
while the maximum allowed workday is seven and a half hours, not
counting one hour of mandatory total rest period during the day.185
Overtime is allowed for reasons such as national necessity, the nature of
operations, or the need for increased output.186 Finally, legal overtime
may not exceed three hours per day, or a total of ninety days per year.187
Complementing the Labour Law provisions concerning the work
week, rest periods and overtime, are sections guaranteeing paid days off.
Workers are given eleven legal paid holidays during the year, including
182 See Blainpain supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text for a discussion on maintenance of
living standard and social dumping as two major policies underlying Charter right of standard wage.
183 Dowling, supra note 3, at 601. The directive would also require employers to treat both
classes of employees as identical for purposes of training, worker representation, social security,
access to social services, and recruitment. Id. at 600 n. 214. Although not specified, one can easily
imagine that equality with respect generally to working conditions is proposed as well.
184 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 147.
185 Id. at 141. (Labour Law, supra note 173, at art. 64) Most establishments are operated six days
per week. If the establishment operates only five days per week, a longer workday is permitted.
Shabon, supra note 103, at 147.
186 Id. at 142. An employer must inform and receive permission from the Regional Labor Direc-
torate for overtime work. Id. at 148. Furthermore, the Ministry of Labor may prohibit a night shift
if it determines that no economic necessity exists for the shift. Id. Each worker retains the right to
decide whether or not he or she will work overtime. Id.
187 Id.
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seven religious holidays.188 Workers wishing to work on these days earn
double the regular wage.189 In addition, workers are entitled to one rest
day on the weekend or, if they work on the weekend, a paid rest day
during the week. 190 What is more, completing one year of service entitles
every employee a certain amount of paid annual leave.' 91 The number of
days to which the employee is entitled increases after specified intervals
of continuous employment, but in no case does it exceed twenty four
days. 192
Considering these provisions, it appears that the Labour Law more
substantially complies with the Charter than most Turkish law. The
Charter, like the Labour Law, calls for a guaranteed annual paid leave
and weekly rest period to all EC workers. 193 Additionally, proposed di-
rectives issued under the Social Action Program in 1990 are similar to
Labour Law provisions, in that they called for tight regulation of work-
ing time, rest periods, night work, and overtime.194
However, the Turkish and EC laws do not mesh entirely. A direc-
tive related to working time has been proposed which would effectively
limit the number of hours per week beyond which an employee could
work, regardless of the overtime rate.195 Furthermore, because a provi-
sion such as this is rooted in the EC policy of reducing unemployment,
196
by its nature it must be inflexible. But the standard Turkish work week
is five hours longer than the proposed EC work week. Additionally,
overtime and holidays may be worked at the employee's discretion.
Considering these facts, whether Turkey is in compliance with both the
spirit and letter of EC law is arguable. The point is that while Turkey
protects the worker by placing a fairly rigid limit on working time,
188 Id. at 152. Before 1981, workers were entitled to more than eleven legal holidays. Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. Note that as of the printing of Shabon, supra note 103, constitutional provisions for paid
annual leave were in the process of being repealed. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
192 Id. at 152 (Labour Law, supra note 174, at art. 49). Currently, the formula provides for
twelve days annual leave for between one and five years of work; 18 days for five to fifteen years; and
24 days for 15 or more years. Id.
193 Charter, supra note 7, at art. 8. Given that the EC Council see limiting work time as a way of
spreading around existing jobs and thereby eliminating unemployment, and that a prior recommen-
dation passed by the Council (See Directive 75/457, supra note 2) called for a maximum standard
work week of 40 hours and minimum four weeks annual paid leave, it is logical that the new direc-
tive will call for working condition standards at least as employer-restrictive as those in the
recommendation.
194 See Dowling, supra note 3, at n. IlI (Proposed Directives issued 6/90 and 7/90).
195 See Proposed Directive on Working Conditions, supra note 92.
196 See Dowling, supra note 3, at n. 212. The provision aims to reduce unemployment by spread-
ing around existing work.
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the length of the Turkish work week and the ease of collecting substan-
tial overtime reduce the Labor Law's effectiveness in lessening
unemployment.
3. Collective Redundancy
Collective redundancy, or mass layoffs, is an area in which Turkey
has already made legislative inroads. Article Twenty-Four of the Labour
Law requires that notice be given to the Regional Labor Directorate by
an employer who wishes to lay off more one-tenth of his work force.19 7
Furthermore, if, within a six month period, the employer needs to refill
the vacancies, he must notify the laid-off employees and rehire those who
wish to return to work.
198
The Turkish regulation is simultaneously more and less worker pro-
tective than EC collective redundancy measures. The EC directive con-
cerning collective redundancy, 199 like Article Twenty-Four of the
Labour Law, requires written notice be given to public authorities by the
employer in the event that he/she wishes to lay-off more than ten percent
of the total work force.2 ° Furthermore, the projected lay-offs may not
occur within thirty days of notice to public authority.201 But EC law has
no equivalent to the Turkish provisions for the rehiring of workers who
are laid-off. In this respect, therefore, the provisions of the Turkish regu-
lation are more worker-protective than the EC standard.
However, the EC directive requires something of the employer
which is not required by the Turkish law. The directive requires that
notice of an anticipated layoff must be given to worker representatives.20 2
The worker representatives are then entitled to require the employer to
consult with them so that an agreement concerning the layoff may be
reached.20 3 The consultation must include conversations pertaining to
ways and means of reducing or avoiding the lay-offs (perhaps an agree-
ment permitting workers to work fewer hours, thereby minimizing lay-
offs).2 o In order to facilitate the discussion, the employer must provide
relevant information to the representatives, including the alleged reasons
197 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 151 ( Labour Law, supra note 174, at art. 24).
198 Id.
199 Council Directive 75/129 of 17 February 1975 Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, 30.
200 Like the Directive, the Labour Law also requires notice to the government in the event that
ten percent of the total workforce is to be laid off. See Shabon, supra note 103, at 151.
201 See supra note 199, at art. 4.
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for the lay-offs.2"5
In contrast, the Labour Law contains no such provision. Turkish
employers are not obligated to consult with worker representatives.
However, neither is the EC employer obligated to recall laid-off workers.
On one hand, the EC solution of forced consultation is arguably more
worker protective (as it may prevent lay-offs in the first place). On the
other hand, Turkey's regulation is more worker protective than the direc-
tive as a consequence of the rehiring provision.
D. Social Protection
Social insurance is one particular area in which Turkey has legis-
lated quite extensively. Protective regulation of workers began in
1863.206 The enactment of the Social Insurance Act of 1964 was Tur-
key's most significant accomplishment in this area.2"7 The act and its
amendments cover varied aspects of the work place and beyond, includ-
ing workers' compensation, occupational hazards, sickness, maternity,
disablement, old age and death.2"8
Under the Act, all employees are automatically insured upon enter-
ing into employment on the basis of a contract.2' Additionally, sickness
benefits are paid up to six months after the worker is incapacitated,
sometimes up to eighteen months, and range from one-third to full sal-
ary, depending on whether there are dependents and/or hospitaliza-
tion.210 When employment related accidents or diseases occur, the
employee is entitled to medical and collateral costs for as long as the
disability remains.
211
In addition to workers' compensation, Turkey provides some unem-
ployment compensation. 212 Rather than providing unemployment insur-
ance, however, Turkey relies upon a system of severance pay.213 Upon
dismissal of a Turkish worker, he or she receives a lump sum payment
equal to thirty days pay for each complete year of employment. 2 4 Fur-
thermore, Turkey's social insurance program provides social security for
205 Id.
206 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 171.
207 Id. Social Insurance Act of 1964.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 172.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 173.
212 Id. at 151.
213 Id.
214 Id. However, the latest amendment to the law on severance pay provides that this pay will be
calculated according to the wages of civil servants. The effect will be to reduce severance payments,
as civil servants have always been paid less than other workers. Id.
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elderly workers in the form of retirement payments, paid out upon the
completion of a requisite number of workdays. 215 Traditionally, upon
retirement, the employee is entitled to retirement payments based on his
or her average pay over an extended period.216 Finally, Turkey main-
tains an employment services organization, which acts as a national em-
ployment agency.217 Turkey's social insurance scheme compares
favorably with the scheme envisioned by the EC Charter.
Charter provisions concerning social insurance are not yet laid out
as extensively as Turkey's Social Insurance Act. The Charter guarantees
social protection,218 which means assuring adequate social security, a
minimum level of aid and social assistance to jobless persons, and possi-
bly unemployment compensation drawn from employer contribution.219
As described in the Social Action Program, this right would grant mini-
mum sustenance to the jobless, and minimum unemployment compensa-
tion.220 Additionally, the Commission stresses assistance to the elderly
in the context of social protection.22 1
Upon analysis, Turkey's social insurance system does not seem in-
ferior to the EC system. Rather than providing for a system of unem-
ployment insurance, Turkey relies on a system of severance pay. At the
very least, both methods assure workers some income in case of termina-
tion, joblessness or retirement. On the whole, the two methods appear
equivalent.
E. Remaining Categories of the Charter
Numerous additional labor law issues remain for harmonization by
Turkey, as many other areas of Turkish law could be subsumed under
the remaining guarantees in the Charter. Most of these areas are beyond
the scope of this paper. However, several areas merit a brief analysis.
215 Id. at 176.
216 This remains true. However, the percentage of the workers' previous earnings, upon which
severance payments were proportionally calculated, has been reduced substantially, resulting in
lower payments. Id. at 175-176. Monthly retirement payments were lowered from 70% of the pre-
vious three years earning to only 60% of the previous five year's earnings. Id. At the same time, the
minimum number of workdays required to earn the pension has been increased by nearly 50%. Id.
at 175-176. The period for which the premiums have to be paid has been increased from 5000 to
7400. Id.
217 See Dereli, supra note 103.
218 Charter, supra note 7, at art. 10.
219 Id.; See also Dowling, supra note 3, at 601.
220 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 601.
221 See Social Action Program, supra note 7, at art. 11.
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1. Equal Treatment of Men and Women
Turkey provides legislative assurances of equal pay for men and wo-
men.222 This is consistent with the policies of the Treaty223 and of the
Council.224 But, the provision concerning equal pay is Turkey's only
equal treatment legislation, 225 and the Council directive calls for exten-
sive equal treatment measures. These measures include equal access to
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working condi-
tions, as well as equal treatment on the job.226 The fact is that women in
Turkey are prohibited from night work, and also from many jobs classi-
fied as heavy or hazardous.227 Conversely, the EC has mandated the ac-
cess to women of all jobs, and the abolition of all laws, regulations and
administrative provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment.
228
2. Vocational Training
The Charter guarantees the right to a lifetime of vocational train-
ing.229 The Commission believes, as well, that vocational education is of
great consequence.230 In Turkey, the government places no legal obliga-
tion on itself to maintain programs for job skills training.23 1 There, voca-
tional training originates with the trade unions, who are legally obligated
to spend five percent of all income to "improve the occupational skill and
knowledge of employees. ' '232 However, it is questionable whether in
most cases the unions fulfill this obligation.233 Turkey's position on this
issue is obviously in stark contrast to the position taken by the
Commission.
222 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 142 (Labour Law, supra note 174, at art. 26). No distinctions
may be made on the grounds of sex in terms of pay when employees are performing the same job
with the same efficiency. See Dereli, supra note 181, at % 195.
223 Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 119 (Equal Pay for Men and Women).
224 See Council Directive 76/207 supra note 2.
225 See Dereli, supra note 181.
226 Council Directive 76/207, supra note 2.
227 See Shabon supra note 103, at 144 (Labour Law, supra note 174).
228 Council Directive 76/207, supra note 2, art. 3, §§ 1, 2a.
229 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 603.
230 Social Action Program, supra note 7 at § 9. "Vocational training is at the forefront of Com-
mission priorities to spearhead a new and indispensable effort to invest in people, in their skills, their
creativity and their versatility." Id.
231 No source purporting to treat Turkey's labor laws gives any attention to the subject of govern-
ment sponsored vocational training, while an affirmative obligation is placed on the labor unions to
promote training.
232 Dereli, supra note 181, at % 197.
233 Id.
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3. Health and Safety
In Turkey, worker health and safety legislation is basic. It gives
particular emphasis on measures to protect women and minors, and also
to health and safety problems of other workers. Legislation is scattered
among different sources.234 Furthermore, health and safety regulations
are issued not by one agency, but rather by the Ministry of Labor jointly
with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.2 35  Significantly, the
Labour Law places the burden of health and safety regulation on the
employer.236 The Ministry of Labor retains the right to come in and
inspect the workplace, and shut down plants when it deems necessary.
237
The Council's approach is more regulation oriented. Rather than
imposing a direct duty on the employer to take all necessary measures,
the EC aids the employer in understanding its obligation through the
existence of extensive regulation.238 This appears to be a different ap-
proach than Turkey's. However, because a thorough explication of Min-
istry regulations is beyond the scope of this article, meaningful analysis
on the substantive effects of these contrasting approaches is impossible.
234 Health and safety law is contained in such various sources as the Labour Law, and also the
Social Insurance Act and the Public Health Act, as well as being promulgated by government
agencies.
235 See Shabon, supra note 103, at 153. Only three basic health provisions exist in the Labour
Law; relating to minimum working age, prohibition of women from night-time and hazardous work,
and paid leave for pregnant women. Id.
236 Id. The government accomplishes this by asserting an affirmative duty upon the employer to
take all necessary measures for the protection of employees on the job. Id. Additionally, medical
reports are required for minors, showing that they are fit to perform the work required of them.
These reports are also necessary for heavy and hazardous work employees. Id.
237 Id. Furthermore, a plant may be shut down, despite the fact that it has fulfilled its legal and
initial health and safety requirements, by the decision of a three person committee, consisting of an
employee, an employer, and a government representative. Id.
238 The Council's first directive concerning this area was 89/391, a document intended to en-
courage measures improving the health and safety of workers. (Council Directive 89/391 of 12 June
1989 Introduction Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health of Workers at
Work, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1. This directive imposes great obligations on employers, ranging from
evaluating risks and changing circumstances to adapting new and less harmful technologies and
giving appropriate instruction to employees. Furthermore, all employers are required to have emer-
gency plans for fires, imminent dangers and evacuation, to make reports of work accidents and
consult employees and allow them to take part in discussion of future measures regarding their
safety. Id. However, the Council has also issued two other types of directives. The first type is of a
highly technical nature. A number of directives were issued prior to the Charter, concerning protec-
tion of workers from certain chemical and isotopes widely used in certain industries. The second
type of directives have been issued as "annexes" to Directive 89/391. The "annexes" both supple-
ment and expand upon Directive 89/391 by providing detailed regulation of all parts of physical
plants. [e.g. Council Directive 89/391 of 30 November 1989 Concerning the Minimum Safety and
Health Requirements for the Workplace (first individual directive within the meaning of Article
16() of Directive 89/391), 1989 O.J. (L 393) 1.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Comparing Turkey's laws to EC laws reveals that Turkish law is
substantially deficient in a number of areas. The first deficiency concerns
the manner of wage determination.239 While the Charter requires EC
member states to base their minimum wage on a desired standard of liv-
ing, Turkey bases its minimum wage on an employer's ability to pay.
Moreover, Turkey intends to solve income inequality by lowering the in-
come of higher paid employees, rather than increasing the salaries of
lower paid employees. Turkey's wage determination methods lead to re-
sults which the Charter attempts to avoid, and are therefore against EC
policy.
The second problem relates to the right to associate, to bargain col-
lectively and to strike.2' Turkey's workers are free to join a union, but
only one. The unions are weak, their finances are controlled by the gov-
ernment, and they are prohibited from engaging in political activity. In
sum, the unions are effectively government controlled and highly re-
stricted. Collective bargaining is restricted to economic issues, and the
right to strike is extremely limited. This contrasts with the powerful,
multinational EC unions, with broad collective bargaining powers, and a
fundamental right to strike created by and found within the Charter.
Two other harmonization problems face Turkey, the equal treat-
ment of men and women, and vocational training.241 Although Turkey
does provide for equal pay, no affirmative programs exist to ensure equal
access to employment, training, promotion and working conditions. In
fact, women do not share equal opportunity for a portion of the work in
Turkey. Furthermore, the government provides little if any vocational
training to workers. Again, equal treatment and vocational training are
both guaranteed by the Charter.
There are several areas in which Turkish laws are more closely
aligned to EC law. Turkey's working time standards provide a cap on
regulation and overtime work, and also grant rest days.242 These em-
ployee protective regulations, are substantially as rigid as the analogous
EC standards. In addition, Turkey's collective redundancy statute con-
tains a clause providing priority rehiring for laid-off workers.
However, it must be noted that even in the areas of working time
and mass layoffs, Turkish law remains suspect. Turkey's standard work
239 See supra Part III, § 1 for discussion of wage determination issues.
240 See supra Part III, § 2 for a discussion of association, collective bargaining and striking.
241 See supra Part III, §§ 5A & 5B for discussion of equal rights and vocational training.
242 See supra Part III, § 3, for a discussion of working time standards, individual service contract,
and collective redundancies in Turkey.
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week is five hours longer than the EC's. Furthermore, Turkey's collec-
tive redundancy statute does not provide, as does the Council directive,
for consultation with worker representatives with a view toward avoiding
layoffs. Lastly, Turkey's laws do not extend equal protections to part-
time employees and to full time employees. EC directives, on the other
hand, mandate equal protection of part-time or seasonal, and full time
employees.
Taken together, the deficiencies in Turkish law pose a formidable
obstacle to harmonization. Although the harmonization process is often
set up within a timetable243 and latitude exists in enacting the law, the
goal remains substantial harmonization of the laws. Major deficiencies
exist, but it is arguable that Turkey's poor economic condition allows it
wider latitude to tailor EC law to its own capabilities. Furthermore,
Turkey has time to enact appropriate legislation.
Turkey possesses many of the necessary mechanisms with which it
may enact the appropriate legislation. First, Turkey is formerly a much
more worker-protective country, experienced with labor legislation. Its
Labour Law dates back to the early 19th century, and has undergone
many revisions. It contains the seeds for vocational programs and
worker participation in management and health and safety policies. Fur-
thermore, the Constitution of 1961 granted many rights to workers. Fi-
nally, the Ministry of Labor has been, in recent times, headed by worker-
friendly leaders. 2"
A potential positive is that some reform may be relatively simple,
albeit controversial. As it has been stated, many or all of the guarantees
in the Charter are issues potentially negotiable through collective bar-
gaining. Therefore, Turkey could go a long way in returning to a
worker-protective environment by merely restoring an all-encompassing
freedom to bargain collectively to its workers.
However, it is clear the work needed to be done is great. If Turkey
were to join the EC today, its current law would act to obstruct the oper-
ation of the single market, as a consequence of its sometimes radical di-
vergence from EC law. What is more, until Turkey provides a standard-
of-living based minimum wage, the potential for social dumping is great.
Exacerbating Turkey's problems is the divergence of Turkish law from
EC law in many other areas which are beyond the scope of this paper.
Factors such as a bad economy, and the ongoing privatization of Tur-
243 See ag., Association Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 12. The Association Agreement pro-
vides, for example, that free movement for workers was to be achieved between the end of the 12th
and the 22nd year following the Agreement's entry into force.
244 Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 11.
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key's state-owned enterprises,245 further complicate harmonization.246
Finally, harmonization will have to be accomplished in a strongly
employer-protective atmosphere. Examining Turkey's recent labor his-
tory reveals diminishing worker rights and an entrenched pro-employer
attitude.247 Constitutional worker rights have been taken away, and
what constitutional rights remain are considered, even by government
officials, to be threatened. Recently, unions and government have be-
come increasingly hostile toward each other.248 Furthermore, instead of
using friendly labor officials to their advantage, the unions did not regard
their appointment as an opportunity for cooperation with government.249
However, the likelihood of meaningful cooperation between unions and
government is doubtful, considering the poor attitudes of government of-
ficials towards unions and union leaders.250
In conclusion, at a time when Europe is accelerating toward the re-
alization of a social Europe, Turkey is an inhospitable place for the ex-
pansion of workers' rights. The harmonization of Turkish with EC labor
law will necessitate overcoming Turkey's strongly pro-employer atmos-
phere, and a reversal of its trend of diminishing worker rights. Although
harmonization is always possible, it seems unlikely in the foreseeable
future.
Jon Viner
245 Turkey, SOCIAL AND LABOR BULLETIN 540 (April 1987). In 1987, more than half of Tur-
key's economy was in the government's, in the form of State Economic Enterprises. Id. In 1985, the
government began the process of privatizing the SEEs. Id. at 541. By 1989, it was estimated that
unemployment had dropped by 65,000 workers and over 360,000 jobs had been created. Turkey,
SOCIAL AND LABOR BULLETIN 182 (February 1989).
246 Because so much of Turkish industry belongs to the government, privatization means restruc-
turing the Turkish economy. SOCIAL AND LABOR BULLETIN 541 (April 1987).
247 The government of Turkey has come under increasingly severe criticism from the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, the AFL-CIO and other organizations, for constitutional restrictions on
worker rights. Foreign Labor Trends, supra note 118, at 12.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Prime Minister Ozal "prides himself on his understanding of industrial dynamics and the
foibles of trade unions and union leaders." Id.
